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Hannah Arendt’s characterization of Adolf Eichmann in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil has significant ramifications for contemporary democratic theory, 
namely that articulated by Sayla Benhabib who advocates for inclusive deliberative processes and 
Hélène Landemore who emphasizes the necessity of cognitive diversity. This paper applies 
Benhabib’s and Landemore’s democratic theories to Arendt’s characterization and diagnosis of 
Adolf Eichmann as an individual who was fundamentally incapable of thinking from the 
standpoint of others. In so doing, this paper seeks to emphasize the necessity of inclusive 
deliberation and cognitive diversity for healthy democratic processes. 
 




In her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, political theorist and 
philosopher Hannah Arendt analyses the testimony of Adolf Eichmann and evidence presented at 
his trial held in Jerusalem in 1961. She reaches several important conclusions about Eichmann, 
though this paper will focus specifically on her observations regarding Eichmann’s inability to 
think for himself or from the standpoint of others. In the fourth chapter of the book Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, philosopher Sayla Benhabib argues 
that deliberation is key to optimal democratic function. Political scientist Hélène Landemore 
argues in her book Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many 
for the epistemic advantage of cognitive diversity in decision-making. Deliberation is the epistemic 
process by which logic and reason are employed in order to thoughtfully weigh options. Cognitive 
diversity refers to the inclusion of individuals with different approaches to problem-solving. In 
terms of ensuring the existence of robust democratic institutions, deliberation and cognitive 
diversity are two sides of the same coin. This paper seeks to apply the theories of deliberation and 
cognitive diversity as articulated by Benhabib and Landemore to the character, behavior and deeds 
of Adolf Eichmann, as uncovered by Arendt during Eichmann’s eight-month trial in Jerusalem, in 
order to show how inclusive deliberation might be a practice that prevents democracies from 
devolving. 
 
According to Benhabib, democracy should take the form of a “deliberative model” or 
“discourse model.” Within this model, decisions are reached via collective, public consideration 
and debate by the members of a polity.1 Deliberative processes are integral to democratic decision-
making because they force individuals to think from the standpoint of others in order to formulate 
arguments that are persuasive to as many people as possible. As such, deliberation is imperative 
to healthy democratic processes because it leads “the individual to further critical reflection on his 
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already held views and opinions.”2 Benhabib explains that “reasoning from the standpoint of all 
involved not only forces a certain coherence upon one’s own views but also forces one to adopt a 
standpoint that Hannah Arendt, following Kant, had called the ‘enlarged mentality.’”3 Adopting 
an “enlarged mentality”, or the capacity to think beyond oneself, is vital if we wish to communicate 
with others effectively, which is a prerequisite for constructive deliberation.  
 
Landemore takes this one step further and argues that “inclusive deliberation” is an epistemic 
necessity within the democratic process (italics mine). In other words, deliberation is more 
successful when the individuals deliberating form a cognitively diverse group. Inclusive 
deliberation “can be expected to have greater epistemic properties than less inclusive deliberation 
because of the greater cognitive diversity a more numerous group is likely to tap.”4 In fact, she 
posits that a group of individuals of average intelligence which is cognitively diverse is a more 
effective decision-making body than a group that is collectively more intelligent but cognitively 
similar.5 This is because cognitive diversity allows us to approach problems from different 
perspectives, thereby capitalizing on different areas of expertise. Landemore’s emphasis on 
inclusivity is key to addressing a possible criticism of Benhabib’s conception of deliberation. 
Benhabib stresses that an “enlarged mentality” is necessary to be as persuasive as possible. Though 
couldn’t this model be legitimately co-opted by extremists? For instance, the Nazis certainly were 
persuasive; they did indeed seem to appeal to the mentality of the German Volk. Koonz explains 
how Hitler’s gift for oratory was based on his ability to perceive the opinions and feelings of his 
audience.  
 
Appropriating the formula of a successful salesman, he would begin by acquainting  
himself with his audience and studying their reactions to several topics. When he had  
identified their desires he would explain confidently why only his Nazi movement could  
fulfill them. Listeners would say to themselves, “Of course, that’s just what I have always  
believed.”6 
 
Evidently, Hitler did possess a sort of “enlarged mentality.” However, Landemore would refute 
that this sort of persuasiveness is democratically or even epistemically valid. Hitler, and effectively 
the rest of the Nazi state, were never engaging in discourse that was remotely inclusive. Their 
rhetoric was meant to be persuasive only to ethnic Germans. The perspectives of non-ethnic 
Germans were certainly never welcomed. As such, the deliberative model that Benhabib and 
Landemore defend disqualifies any regime that is based on exclusivity from legitimacy.  
The necessity of deliberative processes and of cognitive heterogeneity within these processes 
is made tragically obvious by the acts of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann was an SS-
Obersturmbannführer and an organizer of the Holocaust.7 Throughout the eight-month trial in 
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Jerusalem, Arendt observed that Eichmann was incapable of thinking beyond himself. The 
“decisive flaw in Eichmann's character was his almost total inability ever to look at anything from 
the other fellow's point of view.”8 This was made especially evident when he explained that “the 
Jews ‘desired’ to emigrate, and he, Eichmann, was there to help them, because it so happened that 
at the same time the Nazi authorities had expressed a desire to see their Reich judenrein. The two 
desires coincided, and he, Eichmann, could ‘do justice to both parties.’”9 Not only was Eichmann 
unable to see himself as anything but a magnanimous middleman, but he was utterly oblivious to 
the perspectives of those Jews whom he was “helping.” He wanted the Jews to emigrate because 
he decided that emigration (though a more accurate term would be expulsion) of Jews was his area 
of expertise. Therefore, because he wanted the Jews to “emigrate,” he believed the Jews wanted 
to as well.  
 
Upon observing his narcissistic tendencies, Arendt explains that Eichmann’s inability to think 
from the standpoint of someone else was inextricably tied to his inability to think—and 
consequently to speak—in anything but “stock phrases and self-invented clichés.”10 Even 
“when he did succeed in constructing a sentence of his own, he repeated it until it became a 
cliché.”11 To some extent, even Eichmann was aware of this. During the trial he told one of the 
judges, “Officialese [Amtssprache] is my only language.12” In this context, the “officialese” refers 
to the language authorized by Nazi officials for use by any officials who were involved in the 
execution of the Final Solution. In fact, in all official correspondence with regard to the Final 
Solution “it is rare to find documents in which such bald words as ‘extermination,’ ‘liquidation,’ 
or ‘killing’...The prescribed code names for killing were ‘final solution,’ ‘evacuation’ 
(Aussiedlung), and ‘special treatment’ (Sonderbehandlung).”13 Arendt explains that these 
language rules served a dual purpose—they rendered morbid and violent acts sterile and strictly 
objective and they redefined truth as only what is expressed in accordance with the “language 
rules,” i.e. the murder of Jews was a lie, the evacuation of Jews was the truth.14 The cognitive, 
moral and psychological dependence on “officialese,” by Nazi officials of course meant that 
Eichmann was the perfect for the job. As Arendt concludes, “Eichmann's great susceptibility to 
catch words and stock phrases, combined with his incapacity for ordinary speech, made him, of 
course, an ideal subject for ‘language rules.’”15 He was not cognitively capable of questioning the 
Party, and because he never saw anyone else doing so, it never would have occurred to him to do 
so. 
 
 Obviously Eichmann’s “enlarged mentality”—his capacity for empathy—and his 
independence of thought were nonexistent. However, his competence lay elsewhere. He was 
undeniably skilled at organizing the bureaucratic means to execute his job, which was the 
identification, assembly and transportation of Jews from their homes in Germany and German-
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occupied Europe to extermination camps. Arendt explains the terrifying bureaucratic efficiency of 
Eichmann’s forced emigration system. She quotes Jewish functionaries from Berlin who witnessed 
the procedure,  
 
This is like an automatic factory, like a flour mill connected with some bakery. At one  
end you put in a Jew who still has some property, a factory, or a shop, or a bank account,  
and he goes through the building from counter to counter, from office to office, and  
comes out at the other end without any money, without any rights, with only a passport  
on which it says: “You must leave the country within a fortnight. Otherwise you will go  
to a concentration camp.”16 
 
In Berlin, this system so efficiently stripped Jews of their rights and property and ejected them 
from the country that Eichmann was sent to Vienna and Prague to implement the same system. 
 
The fact that Eichmann possessed instrumental rationality—the pursuit and organization 
of the means to an end—but had no capacity to think from the standpoint of others could illustrates 
that the difference between two types of reasoning—instrumental rationality, which involves 
objectivity and pragmatism, and value rationality, which involves deducing the ethical 
course of action. Sociologist Max Weber describes the differences between these two capacities.  
 
Social action, like all action, may be...:(1) instrumentally rational (zweckrational), that is,  
determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other  
human beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the attainment  
of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends; (2) value-rational  
(wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of  
some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects 
of success. 17 
 
This type of value-based rationality, or moral reasoning, is vital to the democratic process, 
specifically within the context of deliberation. The ability to make moral judgements, to judge 
right from wrong, is crucial to robust political participation. This is especially true in instances of 
conflicting moral judgements within a body politic.  
 
Landemore takes this a step further by demonstrating how important different perspectives 
are to deliberative processes. She cites Sidney Lumet’s film Twelve Angry Men to illustrate the 
existence of different types of reasoning. In the film, a juror played by Henry Fonda convinces the 
eleven other jurors to reconsider the guilty sentence they are about to pass on the defendant who 
has been charged with murder. During their reconsideration, 
the contributions of each jury member vary and compliment each other: juror number 5, a  
young man from a violent slum, is the one who notices that the suspect could not possibly  
have stabbed his victim with a switchblade. No other juror was acquainted with the  
proper way to use a switchblade. Juror number 9, who is an old man, then questions the  
plausibility of the time it took one of the key witnesses to cross the corridor. One of the  
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most rational jurors, a stock broker who is not convinced by any of the other arguments,  
finally has to admit that a nearsighted woman is not credible when she pretends to have  
seen the murderer from her apartment across the street, through the window of a passing  
subway, while she was lying in bed, most likely without her glasses.18 
 
Even though this is an example from a film, the point here can certainly be extrapolated to real 
life—different life experiences within a group of people results in a group of individuals that is 
cognitively diverse and can therefore solve problems more effectively together than they can alone. 
 
Clearly, involving the perspectives of others in our own decisions, especially when these 
decisions affect others, is crucial. Eichmann presents perhaps one of the most atrocious examples 
of the consequences of failing to do so. According to Benhabib, ideally, this myopia is exactly 
what the deliberative process ameliorates. When we are deliberating we learn from others, sort 
through our preferences, analyze our opinions, and realize we have to think from another's 
standpoint in order to make arguments that would be persuasive to them. As such, deliberation 
refines our own opinions via collective, public evaluation. On this point Landemore is slightly 
more explicit. She argues that deliberation within the context of diverse perspectives leads to 
optimal outcomes because it will “enlarge the pools of ideas and information…weed out the good 
arguments from the bad” and “lead to a consensus on the ‘better’ or more ‘reasonable’ solution.”19 
Indeed, thinking from the diverse standpoints of others leads to optimal outcomes, but it may very 
well be necessary in order to avoid the worst possible outcome. In the case of Nazi Germany, the 
worst possible outcome was the establishment of a totalitarian state which managed—by virtue of 
a distinct absence of diversity of thought—to exterminate nearly two-thirds of the European Jewish 
population.  
 
One striking example of the necessity of diversity of thought and opinion is outlined by 
Arendt when she explains the extraordinary response of officials in Denmark with regard to the 
“Jewish question.” In Denmark, Nazis met with resistance to all their typical pre-emptive measures 
which were meant to ultimately lead to the deportation of all Jews in the occupied country to 
extermination camps. Besides actually using the Nazi’s revocation of citizenship from Jews to 
protect all the Jewish refugees in Denmark (“the Danes…explained to the German officials that 
because the stateless refugees were no longer German citizens, the Nazis could not claim them 
without Danish assent. This was one of the few cases in which statelessness turned out to be an 
asset, although it was of course not statelessness per se that saved the Jews but, on the contrary, 
the fact that the Danish government had decided to protect them”),20 the Danes also managed to 
change the minds of Nazi officials who were stationed in Denmark with regard to Jews. Indeed,  
the German officials who had been living in the country for years were no longer the same. 
Not only did General von Hannecken, the military commander, refuse to put troops at the 
disposal of the Reich plenipotentiary, Dr. Werner Best, the special S.S. units 
(Einsatzkommandos) employed in Denmark very frequently objected to ‘the measures they 
were ordered to carry out by the central agencies’ - according to Best's testimony at 
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Nuremberg. And Best himself, an old Gestapo man and former legal adviser to Heydrich, 
author of a then famous book on the police, who had worked for the military government 
in Paris to the entire satisfaction of his superiors, could no longer be trusted, although it is 
doubtful that Berlin ever learned the extent of his unreliability.21 
 
Apparently, after being exposed to and living among perspectives that were not manufactured by 
the Nazi state, these individuals “no longer looked upon the extermination of a whole people as a 
matter of course.”22 Tragically, the events in Denmark were the exception to the rule. Arendt 
explains that in Italy and Bulgaria, anti-Semitism didn’t have much traction either, but in these 
countries resistance and protection of Jews was certainly not as blatant, nor did these counties 
manage to change the mind of Nazi officials. One of many lessons to be learned from the conduct 
of the Danes is the necessity of diversity of thought, the requirement that individuals be exposed 
to opinions other than their own. Indeed perhaps the greatest tragedy of the extraordinary events 
in Denmark is just that—they were not ordinary. 
 
 Arendt’s account of Adolf Eichmann and of the events during World War II which led to 
the Holocaust prove the necessity of inclusive deliberation, that is, collective decision-making 
within a group of cognitively diverse individuals. Arendt provides a historical reason for why we 
must take the theoretical arguments put forth by Benhabib and Landemore seriously. Public 
deliberation within the context of a variety of perspectives is perhaps the surest political method 
with which we can try to prevent such sinister politics from ever gaining traction again. 
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